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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War, a large number of countries in 
the developing world emerged from civil conflict or another form of 
chaos in the early 1990s.  While Cold War related conflicts winded 
down, a number of ethnic conflicts erupted, and several military in-
terventions took place.  Interventions were justified either for hu-
manitarian purposes, as in the Balkans and several countries in Af-
rica, or for regime change as in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
A few of these countries have succeeded in constructing a fragile 
peace and embark on what is often a complex and challenging multi-
pronged war-to-peace transition: from conflict and violence to peace 
and improved security; from one-party totalitarian rule to a participa-
tory political system based on democratic principles, the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights; from ideological, ethnic, religious, 
tribal, or class confrontation to national reconciliation so that people 
can live again with each other; and from war-torn economies, weak 
macroeconomic policies, and large imbalances to “post-conflict eco-
nomic reconstruction.” 
This essay uses the term “reconstruction” in a broad sense to in-
clude everything necessary in the transition from war to peace to re-
activate employment in the short-term and set the bases for what No-
bel Laureate Edmund S. Phelps refers to as the “good economy,”1 
that is, an economy that is both dynamic and inclusive. 
 ∗ Research Scholar and Associate Director, Center on Capitalism and Society, 
Columbia University. Post-conflict economic reconstruction is analyzed in greater de-
tail in GRACIANA DEL CASTILLO, REBUILDING WAR-TORN STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF 
POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
 1 See Edmund S. Phelps, The Good Life and the Good Economy: The Humanist Perspec-
tive of Aristotle, the Pragmatists and Vitalists; and the Economic Justice of John Rawls, in 1 
ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AMARTYA SEN (forthcoming 
2008); see also EDMUND S. PHELPS, DESIGNING INCLUSION (2003); EDMUND S. PHELPS, 
REWARDING WORK (1997). 
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In Phelps’s view, the good economy requires creativity and new 
ideas that need to be put into commercial uses, financiers who select 
which entrepreneurs to support through the development stages, and 
the vibrancy of entrepreneurs and consumers who grasp and act on 
the new ideas available in the marketplace.  In his view, a country’s 
economic institutions and its economic culture—not just the rule of 
law and private property rights—impact the actors in the innovation 
process and thus add or detract from an economy’s dynamism. 
In countries coming out of war, innovation will come mostly 
from imitation and adaptation.  Furthermore, financiers are not eas-
ily available, and the government—through effective and transparent 
aid utilization in the form of direct subsidies and credit facilities—
needs to support innovative entrepreneurs and agricultural produc-
ers so they can create a dynamic economy and avoid aid dependence. 
For government support to have a chance, post-conflict eco-
nomic reconstruction should include not only the rehabilitation of 
physical and human infrastructure per se, but also macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural reform policies.  It should also include the 
microeconomic foundations, including an appropriate legal, institu-
tional, and regulatory system and a friendly business climate, neces-
sary for the promotion of market-based investment, employment 
creation, and growth.  Economic reconstruction is a critical but ne-
glected aspect of peacebuilding and state-building literature, where it 
is treated as if it were “development as usual.”2
Early on during the transition to peace, policymakers need to 
address serious macroeconomic imbalances and monetary and fiscal 
management issues with weak bureaucracies, insufficient technical 
capabilities, and serious financing constraints.  This is particularly dif-
ficult in the midst of the political, social, and institutional vulnerabili-
ties and polarization that are the legacy of conflict.  Aid and technical 
assistance are imperative in the short-term and should be targeted at 
improving the capacity of the government to create an adequate en-
vironment conducive to productive investment and growth. 
 2 The term “reconstruction” is often used in a narrow economic sense to refer 
specifically to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and services.  This was the case dur-
ing the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s.  It is also often the case nowadays where the 
other economic activities that need to take place in the transition to peace are con-
sidered “development” activities.  The term “reconstruction” is also often used in a 
political-security sense, where economic reconstruction is only one dimension of the 
transition to peace (and not the most important one).  See JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., 
AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2005); JAMES DOBBINS 
ET AL., U.N.’S ROLE IN NATION BUILDING: FROM THE CONGO TO IRAQ (2005); ROLAND 
PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT (2004). 
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With the support of donors, governments need to make an effort 
early on to reactivate the private sector through the promotion of a 
good business climate for investment.  This includes modernized in-
stitutions, an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, an ade-
quate banking system, a lean and effective bureaucracy, and policies 
for human development.  It is particularly important in post-conflict 
transitions that economic growth create broad-based employment.  
Unless the population at large perceives a “peace dividend” in the 
sense of better access to basic services and infrastructure and a no-
ticeable improvement in their standard of living, the transition to 
peace will not be sustainable. 
Adequate job creation is critical for the success of economic re-
construction.  However, job creation of viable and licit jobs has 
proved particularly difficult in the post-conflict context of the last two 
decades.  The failure of economic reconstruction not only has had 
tragic human consequences for war-torn countries, but it also has had 
costly consequences in terms of military, security, and peacekeeping 
expenditures for the donor community. 
With the exception of El Salvador3 and Croatia,4 economic re-
construction has had a poor record in the post–Cold War period.  
Many countries have been considered a success because they have not 
reverted to war.  This is clearly the case of Mozambique, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Uganda, for example.  From an economic point of 
 3 For an analysis of the transition from war to peace in El Salvador, see KEEPING 
THE PEACE: MULTIDIMENSIONAL U.N. OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA AND EL SALVADOR (Mi-
chael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone & Robert C. Orr eds., 1997); Graciana del Castillo, 
Auferstehen aus Ruinen: Die besonderen Bedingungen des Wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbaus 
nach Konflikten [Postconflict Economic Reconstruction: A Development-PLUS Chal-
lenge], DER ÜBERBLICK, Dec. 2006, at 42; Graciana del Castillo, Arms-For-Land Deal: 
Lessons from El Salvador, in KEEPING THE PEACE: MULTIDIMENSIONAL U.N. OPERATIONS IN 
CAMBODIA AND EL SALVADOR 342 (Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone & Robert C. Orr 
eds., 1997) [hereinafter Arms-For-Land Deal]; Graciana del Castillo, Post-Conflict Peace-
building: The Challenge to the U.N., 55 CEPAL REVIEW 27 (1995) [hereinafter The Chal-
lenge to the U.N.]; Graciana del Castillo, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Challenge to 
the International Organizations: The Case of El Salvador, 29 WORLD DEV. 1967 (2001); 
Alvaro de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ments: Staying the Course in El Salvador, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 189 (1995); and Alvaro 
de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, 94 FOREIGN POL’Y 69 (1994). 
 4 The economic reconstruction of Croatia, by contrast to that of El Salvador, has 
been analyzed more in the context of the transition of Eastern Europe to market-
based economies, than as a country coming out of war.  More research and analysis 
would be desirable to draw lessons from this experience for other war-torn countries.  
It would be particularly interesting to contrast the experience of Croatia, which is 
clearly on a path of normal development, to that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
remains highly aid dependent.  For a discussion of the differences between the tran-
sition in Eastern Europe and that of post-conflict countries see infra Part II. 
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view, however, these economies have become highly aid-dependent 
and thus provide an unsuitable model for economic reconstruction 
in the future.  Inadequate economic policy frameworks and aid prac-
tices in Kosovo, Timor Leste, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and 
many other countries, has not only impeded the creation of jobs nec-
essary to improve the wellbeing of the populations but has also failed 
to facilitate long-lasting peace. 
Post-conflict economic reconstruction puts a heavy burden not 
only on the countries themselves but also on the international com-
munity that facilitates and finances the transition to peace.  Opera-
tionally, reconstruction involves a wide variety of international actors, 
ranging from the U.N. system as a whole to the international finan-
cial institutions (IFIs), the development organizations, bilateral and 
regional donors, and often a large number of non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs). 
The IFIs, which include the Bretton Woods institutions—the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank—and 
the regional development banks, play a critical role in establishing 
the economic and financial framework and the stabilization and 
structural reform policies which are critical for effective reconstruc-
tion.  These institutions become involved in post-conflict economic 
reconstruction in different ways and at different stages.  They assist 
countries at times of peace, and they renew their relationship with 
the country as soon as conflicts end, security conditions permit, and a 
credible government is in place.  Because a critical aspect of recon-
struction is building the institutions and capacity for market-based 
recovery and employment creation at the government level, the IFIs 
play a major role in economic reconstruction. 
The purpose of this essay is fourfold.  In Part II, I compare eco-
nomic reconstruction at the end of the Cold War with successful re-
construction experiences from the past to analyze why the present 
day context has proven to be so challenging.  In Part III, I discuss 
why—despite taking place in countries with low levels of develop-
ment—economic reconstruction is not “normal development” but a 
“development-plus” challenge.  In Part IV, I argue that policymaking 
under normal development is fundamentally different from policy-
making in countries coming out of crises, and that the latter has a dif-
ferent set of priorities as well as constraints.  Finally, in Part V, I ex-
amine and evaluate the role of the IFIs in supporting reconstruction, 
both through policy advice, technical assistance, and financing.  I ar-
gue that the “business as usual approach” of the IFIs to post-conflict 
countries is inadequate and that recent proposals for reform will not 
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suffice to make a difference.  I also argue that to make these institu-
tions more effective in supporting reconstruction, the IFIs should en-
gage their executive boards and management in a broad-based high-
level debate with policymakers in post-conflict countries and with 
academics and practitioners from other organizations. 
II. RECONSTRUCTION IN WAR-TORN COUNTRIES: PAST AND PRESENT 
As the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, many countries came 
out of civil war or other internal conflicts that had been fuelled by 
the Cold War.  Because of the internal nature of the conflicts, these 
countries embarked on a multi-pronged transition.  As Table 1 shows, 
this transition encompasses security, political, social, and economic 
processes. 
 
Table 1: Multi-Pronged Transition From War to Peace 
Transition From To  
  Security  Violence and insecurity 
 
Developing institutions to improve 
public security 
  Political Lawlessness and political exclusion Developing a participatory govern-
ment and respect for the rule of law 
and for human rights 
  Social Ideological, ethnic, religious, or 
class confrontation 
Moving towards national reconcilia-
tion and the development of an insti-
tutional framework to address future 
differences through peaceful means 
  Economic Ruined and corrupt war econo-
mies, statist policies, and large 
macroeconomic imbalances 
Embarking on economic reconstruc-
tion and the creation of viable 
economies that would allow people 
to make a decent and licit living 
 
In contrast to earlier experiences, countries in the transition to 
peace at the present time are at low levels of development and have 
attempted to carry out the security, political, social, and economic 
transitions simultaneously.5  This has made economic reconstruction 
quite distinct and more challenging than reconstruction in the past 
 
 5 See Graciana del Castillo, Afghanistan—The Way Forward, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
153 (2003); Graciana del Castillo, Economic Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Transitions: 
Lessons for the Democratic Republic of Congo, (OECD Dev. Ctr. Working Paper No. 228, 
2003); Graciana del Castillo, The Rules of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE, Aug. 2006. 
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(Table 2).  Although it is not always easy to adapt strategies from one 
country to another or from one period to another when conditions 
are so diverse, it is nevertheless interesting to compare the present-
day challenge with some of the successful experiences with recon-
struction in the past, at least to understand why the present has been 
so overwhelmingly complex and the rate of failure so high.  Until we 
understand what has gone wrong, we will not be able to improve it. 
 
Table 2: Reconstruction in War-Torn Countries: Past and Present 
 Germany 
& Japan 
(late 1940s) 
Other 
Euro-
pean 
Countries
(late 1940s) 
South 
Korea 
(early 
1950s) 
Vietnam 
(1980s & 
1990s) 
Eastern 
Europe 
(early 
1990s) 
Post–Cold 
War 
(1990s) 
Conflict Interstate Interstate Intra/ 
Inter 
Intra/ 
Inter 
Some 
countries  
Intrastate 
Transition: 
 
Political/ 
Economic 
Political/ 
Economic 
Eco-
nomic 
Socio-
Eco-
nomic 
Eco-
nomic/ 
Political 
Political/ 
Security/ 
Social/ 
Economic 
  Political Yes No No No Yes Yes 
  Security No No No No No Yes 
  Social No No No Yes No Yes 
  Economic No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Level of De-
velopment 
High High Low Low Med Low 
  Education/
Gender Gap 
Good Good Bad Good Good Bad 
Market-
Based 
Framework 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Foreign As-
sistance 
U.S. (Mar-
shall Plan  
in Germany) 
U.S. 
(Marshall 
Plan) 
U.S. Interrup-
tion 
USSR/ 
CME 
EU/IFIs IFIs, UN, 
Bilateral, 
NGOs 
Output Collapse  Collapse 
for some 
No  
collapse 
No  
collapse 
Collapse Boom then 
bust 
 
It is widely recognized that the Marshall Plan of 1948–52 for the 
reconstruction of Europe has been the most successful strategy for 
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reconstruction ever.  Although there are clear lessons from this ex-
perience for the post–Cold War countries attempting reconstruc-
tion,6 Europe (with the exception of Germany) did not go through a 
political or social transition at the time of economic reconstruction.  
In fact, these countries had mature political and economic systems 
that could be used in the process of reconstruction.  At the same 
time, because of the inter-state nature of the conflict, there was no 
need for national reconciliation as there is in countries coming out of 
civil war so that former enemies can live with each other in the same 
community.  Nor was there a problem with security after the war 
ended, because institutions for public security were in place and ef-
fective.  Furthermore, European nations had rather homogeneous 
and educated populations and a market-based economic framework 
in place. 
Economic institutions in Europe were strong, human and gov-
ernment capabilities were adequate, and security was no longer a 
problem after the war ended.  This facilitated economic reconstruc-
tion and made it very different from reconstruction in the new con-
text.  Nowadays, most countries in the transition to peace have to cre-
ate civilian police forces because they had become militarized 
societies during the war.  They also need to make serious efforts at 
national reconciliation to ensure that former combatants, refugees, 
and the internally displaced can return to their communities and live 
in peace.  This imposes serious financial and time constraints on eco-
nomic reconstruction. 
In Vietnam,7 another case of successful economic reconstruc-
tion, the need for reconciliation between the North and the South 
was large after the U.S. troops left the country in 1975.  Thus, eco-
nomic reconstruction took place amid the social transition.  Contrary 
to the present-day experiences, however, Vietnam did not move to-
 6 For an analysis of the Marshall Plan and lessons for post–Cold War cases, see 
GRACIANA DEL CASTILLO, REBUILDING WAR-TORN STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF POST-
CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION 21–26, 78–91 (2008). 
 7 Because of the lack of involvement of the international community in Vietnam 
prior to the early 1990s, it is not easy to find good information about the early period 
with reconstruction.  For an interesting early study see Gabrielle Lipworth & Erich 
Spitäller, Viet Nam—Reform and Stabilization: 1986-92 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 93/46, 1993).  See also A. Terry Rambo, Nguyen Mann Hung & Neil L. 
Jamieson, The Challenges of Vietnam’s Reconstruction, ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES, Apr. 1993, at 
5.  For more recent analyses, see POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN JAPAN, REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA, VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, EAST TIMOR AND AFGHANISTAN: PROCEEDINGS OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN HIROSHIMA (Nassrine Azini, Matt Fuller, & Hiroko 
Nakayama eds., 2002); and INITIATIVE FOR POL’Y DIALOGUE, VIET NAM COUNTRY 
DIALOGUE (2004). 
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ward a more participatory type of government at the same time.  By 
remaining a single-party system, Vietnam avoided the political transi-
tion.  Vietnam was also different from the more recent experiences in 
that, due to the U.S. embargo which lasted until 1993, there was no 
involvement from the IFIs and reconstruction took place with little 
foreign assistance. 
Reconstruction in Vietnam was similar to many post–Cold War 
experiences in the sense that it involved a country at a very low level 
of development.  Despite this, a mixture of Confucian and Commu-
nist influences in Vietnam had resulted in a well educated population 
in terms of literacy with hardly any gender gap, despite per capita in-
come levels comparable to those of Afghanistan.  This was indeed a 
significant advantage in the reconstruction of Vietnam, particularly in 
comparison to countries in Africa, Central America, and Asia where 
low levels of education and the gender gap have been serious con-
straints to effective reconstruction. 
Korea in the 1950s is another example of successful economic 
reconstruction, under very different conditions from those in Viet-
nam.  Reconstruction in Korea started with very low levels of devel-
opment, with illiteracy rates among the highest in the world, but with 
large amounts of U.S. aid.8  Like Vietnam, Korea did not go through 
 8 United States assistance to Korea while the Cold War was ranging was quite dif-
ferent from what it had been in Japan a few years earlier.  In Japan, the United 
States’s first objective had been to “demilitarize and democratize” Japan with little 
economic assistance.  Thus, the reactivation of the economy was financed by the 
Bank of Japan through money creation, with serious inflationary consequences.  On-
ly in 1947, with the deepening of the Cold War, did the U.S. policy change in favor of 
economic reconstruction and building an industrial power in the Pacific.  For details, 
see Koichi Hamada & Munehisa Kasuya, The Reconstruction and Stabilization of the Post-
war Japanese Economy: Possible Lessons for Eastern Europe, in POSTWAR ECONOMIC 
RECONSTRUCTION AND LESSONS FOR THE EAST TODAY 155–87 (Rudiger Dornbusch, 
Wilhelm Nölling & Richard Layard eds., 1993).  As part of the change in policy and 
in an effort to reopen private foreign trade, the Cotton Revolving Fund, a credit fa-
cility to reactivate the cotton spinning industry, was established in 1947.  Neverthe-
less, efforts at providing aid at a large scale (an Asian “Marshall Plan”) were put aside 
in late 1948 as the U.S. Congress massively cut aid and the National Security Council 
adopted Resolution 13/2, establishing a stringent stabilization and reconstruction 
program.  This program, known as the Dodge Plan, was not unlike some of the more 
recent programs under the sponsorship of the IFIs in countries such as the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others, and consisted of tight mone-
tary and fiscal policies and the unification of the exchange rate.  For details of the 
Dodge Plan, see TAKAFUSA NAKAMURA, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE ECONOMY: ITS 
DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE 21–49 (1981). 
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a simultaneous political transition, but, unlike Vietnam, it did not 
need the move from state-led to market-based policies.9
In Eastern Europe, several countries, particularly Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia, have gone through devastating conflicts, 
often involving more than one country.  Nevertheless, economic re-
construction of these countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall dif-
fered from that of countries coming out of war at that time outside 
Europe because countries in Eastern Europe had stronger political 
systems.  They also lacked the polarization created by years of internal 
conflict that has made policymaking particularly difficult in other 
countries.  At the same time, they had better human resources and 
government capabilities that provided them with wider options in 
their move towards market-based policies. 
Another notable difference between Eastern-European Coun-
tries and other post–Cold War experiences is that while economic re-
construction and the move from statist policies to market-based poli-
cies resulted in a collapse in output in the former, this was not the 
case in the latter.10
The fact that output does not collapse—and in fact often grows 
rapidly—in countries outside Eastern Europe that have gone through 
the war-to-peace transition in the last two decades, not only gives 
them a false sense of success but also allows the IFIs to claim success 
for their policies.  Because in the post–Cold War period the multi-
pronged transition to peace takes place at low levels of development, 
foreign assistance and the presence of the international community 
in these countries is large.  Such presence—which often includes 
large peacebuilding missions with military and police forces and civil-
ian staff, as well as a number of other actors including the IFIs, other 
development agencies, bilateral donors, NGOs, and others—normally 
creates a boom in the immediate transition to peace. 
Growth is not the same as the “dynamism” that Phelps discusses. 
This type of growth is neither healthy nor sustainable.  Because a 
 9 For a discussion of the reconstruction of South Korea and lessons for North 
Korea, see Jenny Town, Post-War South Korean Economic Reconstruction: A Case Study 
(Dec. 2007) (on file with author). 
 10 For an analysis of the economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe, see MARIO I. 
BLEJER & MARKO ŠKREB, FINANCIAL SECTOR TRANSFORMATION: LESSONS FROM 
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION (1999); MARIO I. BLEJER & MARKO ŠKREB, CENTRAL BANKING, 
MONETARY POLICIES, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSITION ECONOMIES (1999); MARIO 
I. BLEJER & MARKO ŠKREB, MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
(1997); ROMAN FRYDMAN, ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, & JOHN S. EARLE, THE PRIVATIZATION 
PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE (1993); ROMAN FRYDMAN, ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, & JOHN S. 
EARLE, THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE BALTIC STATES (1993). 
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large presence of the international community in poor countries cre-
ates a large number of distortions in terms of inflation, higher rents, 
misallocation of human capital and other resources, it is difficult to 
make this type of growth healthy.  To make growth sustainable and 
avoid the bust that normally follows as the international community’s 
presence withers, the reactivation of the private sector through en-
trepreneurship and inclusion needs to take priority.  In general, 
countries have not managed this challenge well, and many of them 
become seriously aid dependent in the transition to peace, a situation 
that is not sustainable in the long-term. 
The absence of a “peace dividend,” the heavy reliance on aid, 
and the slow transition from “humanitarian” to “reconstruction” aid 
has made recent reconstruction also different from the post–World 
War period.  The peace dividend, which in a fiscal sense includes the 
reduction in military expenditure following the end of conflict, 
helped finance the European economies.  At the same time, their 
governments were able to finance their budgets through bond issu-
ing.  The situation has been fundamentally different in the post–Cold 
War context: except for a few resource-rich countries, with Angola 
the most notorious, most post-conflict countries are now highly de-
pendent on official aid flows—mostly in the form of grants—to fi-
nance their reconstruction plans.11  Because Cold War related con-
flicts were largely foreign financed, military aid fell as war ended, 
depriving them of a peace dividend in the fiscal sense.  Furthermore, 
because the transition often takes place in failed states, breakaway 
provinces, and some of the countries at the bottom of the United Na-
tions Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index, 
the reintegration of a large number of former combatants, returnees, 
and internally displaced into productive activities has proven particu-
larly challenging. 
Since the end of the Cold War, donors have provided large 
amounts of “humanitarian aid” to countries coming out of war in or-
der to save lives and improve living conditions of the groups most af-
fected by the conflict.  Humanitarian aid allows vulnerable popula-
tions to increase their consumption of food and basic services.  This, 
however, creates price and other distortions that discourage produc-
tion and—like welfare programs—also discourages work and entre-
preneurship.  Only “reconstruction aid,” which is directed mainly to-
 11 Despite oil revenue amounting to about $90 billion since 2005, Iraq has used 
only a small amount in its own reconstruction. See, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, STABILIZING AND REBUILDING IRAQ: IRAQI REVENUES, EXPENDITURES, AND 
SURPLUS (2008). 
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wards investments in infrastructure, services, and the reactivation of 
agriculture, creates short-term employment.  If reconstruction aid is 
well invested and the investment climate improves, this type of aid 
will also have a positive impact on longer-term job creation as firms 
reactivate and expand their activities in industry, services, and else-
where.12
The difference between “humanitarian” and “reconstruction” 
aid—which has been often blurred in the present-day context by hav-
ing the same actors providing both—was very clear at the time of the 
reconstruction of Europe following World War II.  In his book enti-
tled The Marshall Plan, Allen W. Dulles argued that it would be a waste 
of money for the United States merely to provide humanitarian aid to 
feed the Europeans for a year or two.  He argued that reconstruction 
aid was necessary to give them the tools without which they would 
have little chance of righting their own war-torn countries.  He 
stressed that policies adopted in the first year of the Plan would be 
decisive in determining how reconstruction proceeded.  Dulles 
quoted Henry Hazlitt, a renowned journalist and advocate of free en-
terprise, who made the case that aid would be of little value unless 
Europe “discontinues policies which unbalance its trade and discour-
age or prevent production . . . . Unsound fiscal and economic policies 
can make any outside help futile.” 13
In comparison with previous experiences, reconstruction in the 
post–Cold War period has a dismal record.  This has to do with the 
difficulty of carrying out economic reconstruction amid the political, 
security, and social constraints described above.  The financial bur-
den of peace-related programs in these areas and their low level of 
development has made these countries highly dependent on aid.  
The focus on humanitarian rather than reconstruction aid, which has 
made job creation difficult, has been a major problem.  In these situa-
tions, the political and security objectives often conflict with optimal 
economic and financial policies. 
While policymakers, academics, and practitioners at the highest 
level debated every possible issue and policy option relating to eco-
nomic reconstruction following the two World Wars, reconstruction 
following the Cold War has failed to generate such a debate.  In its 
 12 For an analysis of the differences between these two types of aid and the dis-
tinct impact on reconstruction, see Dimitri G. Demekas, Jimmy McHugh & Dora 
Kosma, The Economics of Post-Conflict Aid, (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/02/198, 
2002). 
 13 ALLEN W. DULLES, THE MARSHALL PLAN 101–02 (Michael Wala ed., Berg Pub-
lishers 1993) (original 1948 manuscript is located in the Allen W. Dulles Papers at 
Princeton University). 
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absence, and because post-conflict economic reconstruction since the 
early 1990s has taken place amid low levels of development, it has 
been treated as “development as usual.”  This is how the IFIs ap-
proach reconstruction.  It is the wrong approach and it needs to be 
corrected, particularly in light of the serious financial crisis that will 
lower the prospects for aid. 
III. A “DEVELOPMENT-PLUS” CHALLENGE 
Post-conflict reconstruction is not “development as usual.”14  Si-
milarities do indeed exist between “normal development” and “post-
conflict economic reconstruction.”  In fact, economies coming out of 
internal strife or conditions of extreme socio-political upheaval share 
a number of characteristics with countries under normal develop-
ment: 
• Destroyed and distorted economies, low levels of devel-
opment, and high levels of poverty; 
• Weak institutional, legal, regulatory, and judicial systems; 
• Poor governance, inadequate human resources and ad-
ministrative and managerial capabilities; and 
• High indebtedness, large arrears, and dependence on 
aid. 
Furthermore, the same generic principles apply to both.  For ex-
ample, countries undergoing reconstruction—the same as those in 
the normal process of development—need to do the following: 
• Build national capabilities and institutions; 
• Promote on-the-job training; and 
• Generate employment in a dynamic and relentless way. 
Similarities between normal development and post-conflict eco-
nomic reconstruction, however, should not lead to their conflation.  
Post-conflict countries have special needs, require specific activities, 
and have risks that are distinct from those under normal develop-
ment.  These are the reasons: 
• Governments in post-conflict countries need to carry out 
a number of additional activities, including the disarm-
 14 This argument is certainly not new.  It was first discussed in The Challenge to the 
U.N., supra note 3.  It was developed in Graciana del Castillo, Economic Reconstruction 
in Post-Conflict Transitions, in PRAGUE TO PRETORIA: TOWARDS A GLOBAL CONSENSUS ON 
THE DOCTRINE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (Mark Malan & Christopher Lord eds., 
2000).  However, in the second half of the 1990s this argument was resisted by the 
development organizations, particularly the UNDP but also the World Bank that pre-
ferred to treat it as business as usual.  For details on how these organizations argued 
at the time and how their thinking evolved over time, see DEL CASTILLO, supra note 6, 
at 31–35. 
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ing, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into society 
and productive activities of former combatants and other 
groups that have been involved in the conflict, as well as 
the demining of their territory; 
• Post-conflict economic reconstruction takes place amid 
the constraints and fiscal burden of the multi-pronged 
transition to peace; and 
• Post-conflict countries have roughly a fifty percent chance 
of reverting to war or chaos15 which sets the stakes to suc-
ceed high. 
Because of these factors, post-conflict reconstruction is a “devel-
opment-plus challenge”: countries emerging from protracted civil 
wars have to confront the normal challenge of socio-economic devel-
opment while simultaneously accommodating the additional burden 
of national reconciliation and peace consolidation.  The latter is es-
sential so that former enemies can live with each other and address 
their grievances through political, institutional, and peaceful means. 
The IMF and other IFIs, such as the World Bank and the re-
gional development banks, play a critical role in post-conflict eco-
nomic reconstruction.  Putting aside the human cost of returning to 
conflict,16 the high risk that this entails makes reconstruction an in-
vestment with a potentially high-rate of return for national govern-
ments and the international community.  If reconstruction is effective 
and it succeeds, large spending in military, security and peacekeeping 
operations will be avoided in the future.17
 15 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Devel-
opment, Security, and Human Rights for All, ¶ 114, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).  The report notes that “[r]oughly half of all coun-
tries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years.”  Id. 
 16 For example, the human cost of the Iraq war has been tremendous.  American 
military casualties in Iraq since the invasion in 2003 have amounted to 4200.  Casual-
ties of coalition troops have been over 300 and of contractors have reached 450.  Al-
though figures vary, Iraqi deaths due to the U.S. invasion have been estimated by var-
ious organizations at well over one million Iraqis. 
 17 AMY BELASCO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE COST OF IRAQ, 
AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 (2008), re-
ports cost estimates for Iraq of $653 billion, for Afghanistan of $172 billion, and for 
enhanced security $28 billion (these figures include bridge financing until next ad-
ministration takes over).  Of these, about ninety-four percent of the funds were for 
the Department of Defense and only six percent for foreign aid programs and em-
bassy operations and less than one percent for medical care of veterans.  This shows 
how disproportionate the allocations have been.  The Report also shows that while 
foreign aid programs dropped in Iraq from $19.5 billion in fiscal year 2004 to an an-
nual average of less than $3 billion in the next four years, defense expenditure in-
creased from $56 billion to $145 billion in fiscal year 2008.  A larger investment in 
reconstruction early on, together with a good strategy and appropriate policies, 
could have avoided the large increase in military expenditure over the years.  Peace-
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The development-plus challenge that post-conflict countries face 
is particularly arduous because, after years of political polarization 
and ideological or ethnic confrontations, building consensus on mac-
roeconomic policymaking is hard.  At the same time, putting the 
economy back on a path of stabilization and growth becomes impera-
tive if large numbers of former combatants of both sides, and other 
conflict-affected groups including returnees, internally displaced per-
sons, and the resident population in former zones of conflict, are to 
be reintegrated effectively and permanently into the productive life 
of the country. 
IV. ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING IN CRISIS SITUATIONS 
Economic policymaking during reconstruction—as well as fol-
lowing other crises such as financial chaos or natural disaster—is 
clearly distinct from policymaking in the normal process of develop-
ment (Table 3).  While under normal development, economic poli-
cies can be established with a medium- and long-term framework, re-
construction most often requires emergency policies that are often 
distortionary and normally contribute little or nothing at all to me-
dium- and long-term development.  This is true, for example, when 
food aid, that might be necessary to avoid a humanitarian disaster, 
distorts price mechanisms and work incentives which discourage the 
reactivation of the agricultural sector.  It is also the case when tempo-
rary housing or medical centers have to be established to save lives 
but will not be long-lasting, and thus, will fail to contribute to the 
long-term development of the housing and health sectors. 
keeping costs are also large.  The 2008 to 2009 budget for U.N. peacekeeping is over 
$7 billion, involving 90,000 uniformed personnel as compared to only 5000 expatri-
ate civilians and 15,000 local ones. 
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Table 3: Differences Between Policymaking in Normal  
Development and in Crisis Situations 
Normal Development Crisis Situations 
Medium and long-term framework 
 
Requires (distortionary) emergency pro-
grams 
Application of the “equity principle” 
 
Application of the “ethics of reconstruc-
tion” 
Low and stable foreign assistance 
 
Sharp spikes in foreign assistance 
Government establishes rule of law 
 
Foreign troops and police support rule of 
law 
Foreign political involvement consid-
ered an interference in national affairs 
Intensive and often intrusive political in-
volvement of the international community 
 
Policymaking under normal development is guided by different 
principles than in countries coming out of crises.  While the ethics of 
normal development determines that all groups with the same need 
should be treated equally (“equity or development principle”), the 
ethics of reconstruction determines that groups most affected by the 
conflict should be given special attention in the short-term (“political 
principle or ethics of reconstruction”).  This is so because of the high 
probability that these groups will revert to conflict should this not be 
the case.  Development institutions, including the World Bank, have 
often found it difficult to break the equity principle that guides nor-
mal development and give special preferences to some groups over 
others with similar needs on the grounds that in post-conflict recon-
struction the political objective should prevail at all times. 
Two other factors that make policymaking different under nor-
mal development than during post-conflict reconstruction are the in-
volvement of the international community in the domestic affairs of 
the countries and the spikes in international technical and financial 
assistance during reconstruction.  Under normal development, the 
first factor would be considered interference with the internal affairs 
of the country and its national sovereignty.  The second factor creates 
the challenge in post-crisis countries of effectively and transparently 
managing large flows of aid in the short-term and avoiding aid de-
pendency in the medium- and long-term. 
At the same time, the large physical presence of the interna-
tional community in post-conflict countries often creates serious dis-
tortions as a result of these two factors.  Such presence not only dis-
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torts prices, wages, and rents, but it also deprives the national civil 
service and other public offices of the most qualified people in the 
country.  Furthermore, by employing those people in jobs in which 
they may eventually lose their skills, countries are affecting not only 
their present but also their future productive capacities.  It is not 
hard to imagine how a civil engineer or an oncologist may lose their 
expertise after working for the United Nations or an NGO as a driver 
or translator for many years. 
Countries in the normal process of development rely largely on 
domestic savings (the most important source of development finance 
in developing countries) to finance investment.  Frequently, these 
countries also have access to inflows of private capital in the form of 
loans or foreign direct investment.  Post-conflict countries, on the 
other hand, rely heavily on official flows (government aid and loans) 
for what often proves to be a long and difficult transition.  Until gov-
ernments establish credibility in the post-conflict transition and the 
issue of property rights is appropriately resolved, private flows (loans 
and foreign direct investment) will not be available during recon-
struction. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE IFI 
A critical factor in making peace sustainable—as we saw most 
tragically in Lebanon in the summer of 2006—is the need to disarm, 
demobilize, and reintegrate into society and into productive activities 
former combatants and other groups that have been involved in the 
conflict.  This is a long and expensive process that has proved to have 
important fiscal and financial consequences.  The last twenty years of 
reconstruction provide enough empirical evidence that DDR pro-
grams will not succeed unless the economy is rapidly brought onto a 
path of growth and employment creation.  It is because of these fac-
tors that the IFIs play such a critical role in post-conflict economic re-
construction. 
Given the dismal record of economic reconstruction in the last 
two decades and the need for a broad-based debate on issues and pol-
icy options to improve performance in the future, the role of the dif-
ferent actors—including the United Nations and its agencies, bilat-
eral donors, NGOs and other actors, and the national governments 
themselves—should be questioned.  The purpose here is to focus on 
the IFIs.  In this regard, three questions become relevant: 
• Are macroeconomic stabilization policies and market-
based reforms “imposed” by the IFIs in post-conflict 
countries or has there been national “ownership” of these 
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policies? 
• Is the macroeconomic and institutional framework de-
signed by the IFIs “appropriate” for these countries? 
• Are the IFIs’ aid mechanisms “adequate” for effective 
policymaking in post-conflict countries? 
Before these questions are answered, it is important to under-
stand that the IFIs’ involvement in post-conflict reconstruction takes 
place through four basic channels:18
• Policy advice under different arrangements—
surveillance; staff-monitored programs (SMPs), or an up-
per-tranche program (UTC);19 
• Technical assistance and capacity building; 
• Financing reconstruction; and 
• Catalyzing resources from other institutions and govern-
ments. 
Although there are overlapping areas in which the different IFIs 
collaborate, there is a basic division of labor among them.  The IMF 
helps countries to rebuild their capacity in the fiscal, monetary, ex-
change, and statistical areas.  The World Bank and the regional de-
velopment banks focus on rebuilding the microeconomic founda-
tions for investment, employment, and growth. 
Although the IFIs can provide policy advice and technical assis-
tance to all member states, the provisions of aid to post-conflict coun-
tries is normally restricted until the country clears debt arrears to the 
IFIs and normalizes any relations suspended because of those arrears.  
In addition to providing policy advice on a number of macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic issues, the IFIs also advise post-conflict 
countries on how to solve the arrears problems and on debt renego-
tiations because many of them require debt relief. 
A. “Ownership” of Market-Based Reforms 
A much-debated issue is whether the IFIs have “imposed” on 
post-conflict countries macroeconomic discipline and a market-based 
 18 For an analysis of IMF incursion into post-conflict countries see Int’l Monetary 
Fund [IMF], Fund Involvement in Post-Conflict Countries, BUFF/95/98, Sept. 19, 1995; 
IMF, Fund Involvement in Post-Conflict Countries, EBS/95/141, Aug. 16, 1995; World 
Bank, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank, Apr. 1998; World Bank, 
The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 1998.  See also IMF & World 
Bank, Issues Note on Providing Additional Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries, 
EBS/98/155, Sept. 1, 1998.  See also, IMF, Concluding Remarks by the Chairman: Issues 
Note on Providing Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries, BUFF/98/102, Sept. 22, 1998. 
 19 UTC programs normally refer to Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) or Poverty Re-
duction and Growth Facilities (PRGF). 
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framework, or whether there has been “national ownership” for such 
policies. 
It seems that monetary and fiscal disciplines, as well as the mar-
ket-based institutional frameworks developed by post-conflict coun-
tries, have not been “imposed” by the IFIs.  In most cases it has been a 
more pragmatic than ideological move.  With disillusion with central 
planning policies and the increase in globalization, even socialist 
countries such as Vietnam and China moved towards market-based 
policies and macroeconomic discipline on their own, without imposi-
tion from the IFIs. 
At the same time, countries that embark on post-conflict eco-
nomic reconstruction with weak fiscal and debt situations find it diffi-
cult to adopt expansionary Keynesian policies to stimulate aggregate 
demand through public work or other programs, unless they are able 
to rely on aid to do so.  Because public jobs often become recurrent 
expenditures of the government and aid soon withers in the transi-
tion to peace to more normal and reduced levels, governments real-
ize that the creation of employment requires a rapid reactivation of 
the private sector.  It is in the ability to create such jobs through the 
promotion of entrepreneurship and through small-scale labor-
intensive agricultural production where recent experiences have 
largely failed. 
Of course, countries have differed in the speed, sequence, and 
comprehensiveness with which they have followed stabilization poli-
cies and market-based reforms, and particularly on the role they have 
kept for the state in their economies.  They have also differed with 
regard to government “ownership” of such policies and reforms. 
In Vietnam, for example, after thirty years of war, reunification 
between the North and South took place in 1975.  For the next dec-
ade, economic reform was conducted according to central planning 
in which the government exercised strong control over the economy 
through regulations and support for the development of heavy indus-
try and infrastructure.  Although some market mechanisms were 
maintained in the South, central planning resulted in a highly dis-
torted and inefficient economy. 
By the mid-1980s, with a population of over sixty million, a rapid 
population growth rate (over two percent), a large percentage of the 
population below fifteen years of age, sixty percent of it in poverty, 
and dismal social indicators, job creation became a main concern.20  
For the next three years the government followed a piecemeal ap-
 20 Data on Vietnam are from the IMF.  See Lipworth & Spitäller, supra note 7. 
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proach to socialist reforms in which efforts were made to reactivate 
agriculture without eliminating the strong distortions existing in the 
economy.  By the end of the decade, however, high inflation, low 
growth, and large fiscal and external deficits had become unsustain-
able and impossible to finance, following the collapse in aid from the 
former Soviet Union and the breakdown in the preferential agree-
ments with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
area with which Vietnam was integrated. 
It was under these conditions that in 1989—well before relations 
with the IFIs had resumed in 1993—Vietnam started its “Doi Moi” 
(Renovation) Program.  This included bold and comprehensive re-
forms in a number of areas, including far-reaching land reform, price 
liberalization and restructuring of state enterprises, modernization of 
the financial sector, freer trade, exchange rate unification, and tax 
reform.  These reforms, together with Vietnamese entrepreneurship, 
led to a better allocation of resources, dynamic growth with stable in-
flation, low fiscal deficits, extraordinary gains in poverty alleviation, 
and rapid integration into the world economy through rapid export 
growth. 
Thus, while Vietnam moved pragmatically and gradually into 
market-based reforms as a result of the failure of central planning, 
other countries such as Afghanistan have moved into market-based 
reforms with the support of the IFIs and with a bang—rather than a 
gradual approach.  In Kabul this took place with strong ownership 
under the leadership of the Minister of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, who 
was more “royalist than the king” in pushing for comprehensive mar-
ket-based reform, despite overwhelming opposition from other gov-
ernment officials and without building consensus among the popula-
tion at large. 21
The issue of ownership has proved to be a key factor in success-
ful reconstruction.  The IFIs and other donors should not impose 
their vision of reconstruction on national governments.  However, 
neither should key government officials, without the support of oth-
ers, impose their own vision on the population at large.  For recon-
struction to be effective and sustainable there should be a participa-
tory process in setting up national priorities. 
 21 Although well intended and appropriate for countries at a different stage of 
development and not coming out of thirty years of conflict, macroeconomic policies 
adopted in Afghanistan not only lacked widespread “ownership” but were inadequate 
for such country at such time.  See Part V.B. infra.  
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B. Adequacy of the Macroeconomic and Institutional Framework 
Early in the transition to peace, countries need to establish the 
macroeconomic framework and its microeconomic foundations (in-
cluding the institutional, legal, and regulatory systems, as well as an 
adequate business climate).  This is important because good eco-
nomic management and stability are critical to the success of eco-
nomic reconstruction.22
There is no longer much debate—even among socialist lead-
ers—on the importance of good macroeconomic management and 
the need for solid micro-foundations to support it and create an envi-
ronment conducive to private investment and growth.  The issue is 
whether the macroeconomic and institutional framework that post-
conflict countries have adopted is adequate to allow governments to 
play the active role they need to play in reconstruction.  Governments 
need to ensure that the political objective of the transition to peace 
(or peace objective) prevails over all others to ensure that conflict 
does not recur. 
To be effective, this framework needs to be simple and flexible.  
A simpler framework requires a lower level of expertise to operate 
and presents fewer opportunities for mismanagement and corrup-
tion.  The more flexible the framework, the easier it will be to inte-
grate the political (“peace”) and the economic (“development”) ob-
jectives of post-conflict reconstruction. 
In setting up this framework, the IFIs, particularly the IMF, have 
been playing an expanding role over time.  In fact, as Kristen Boon 
has argued, the IFIs, despite a lack of mandate, have adopted “quasi” 
legislative functions in many of these countries—including Afghani-
stan and Iraq—in establishing policies and institutions for economic 
 22 The Fund has prepared a number of studies on how to assist countries in 
building up their macroeconomic framework.  For earlier work prepared in collabo-
ration with the United Nations, see IMF, The Design of a Minimal Monetary and Ex-
change Rate Structure for Countries in Post-Chaos/Post-Conflict Situations (July 
1995) (unpublished background paper for the third meeting of the High Level 
Group on Development Strategy and Management of the Market Economy); IMF, 
Outlines of the ‘Architecture’ of a Minimalist Fiscal Framework for Countries in Post-
Chaos/Post-Conflict Situations (July 1995) (unpublished background paper for the 
third meeting of the High Level Group on Development Strategy and Management 
of the Market Economy).  For more recent work, see IMF, Background Paper for MFD 
Technical Assistance to Recent Post-Conflict Countries, (Dec. 13, 2004); IMF, Background 
Paper for Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries, (Dec. 10, 2004) [herein-
after Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions]; IMF, MFD Technical Assistance to Recent Post-Conflict 
Countries, (Dec. 13, 2004); IMF, Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries, 
(Dec. 10, 2004). 
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reconstruction.23  Putting aside the issue of mandate, I argue that the 
main concern from an economic point of view is that policies and the 
institutional framework adopted in many post-conflict countries is of-
ten inadequate and has been a factor in the failure of reconstruction 
efforts. 
Because the objective of peace should always prevail over that of 
development, if the two ever come into conflict—which they often 
do—“first best” or optimal economic policies are not often attainable 
or even desirable.24  Furthermore, peace-related programs should get 
priority in budget allocations.  Thus, the independence of the central 
bank and the “no-overdraft” rule for budgeting financing—a desir-
able policy framework under normal development—proved too re-
strictive in Afghanistan. This has been a serious problem because it 
has impeded an active role of the government in creating licit jobs in 
the economy.25
Similarly, in the case of Timor-Leste, the utilization of its rich oil 
and gas reserves in the Timor Gap as if it were a “development as 
usual” situation impeded the successful completion of its economic 
 23 See Kristen E. Boon, Open for Business: International Financial Institutions, Post-
Conflict Economic Reform and the Rule of Law, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513, 513–81 
(2007). 
 24 In 1995 I first argued that post-conflict countries “have to settle for less than 
optimal policies in their economic reform efforts.”  The Challenge to the U.N., supra 
note 3, at 30.  At this time the IFIs considered this “heresy.”  Id.  A few years later, I 
argued that assistance to post-conflict countries required the rethinking of analytical 
and operational issues to frame them in a multi-disciplinary strategy in which “first-
best” policies based on purely economic profit-maximizing criteria are often not ap-
propriate or even recommended.  Arms-For-Land Deal, supra note 3, at 1968.  It took 
over a decade of IFIs’ involvement in post-conflict reconstruction for them to ac-
knowledge this.  In Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries, the IMF ac-
knowledged that their advice was tailored to the circumstances of post-conflict coun-
tries.  As an example, the IMF mentions that with respect to tax policy, there was 
generally more openness to policies that were not first-best from an efficiency point 
of view (e.g., export taxes), given the urgent need to generate revenue.  Rebuilding 
Fiscal Institutions, supra note 22, at 5.  The IMF notes, however, that from an efficiency 
standpoint, these taxes leave much to be desired, as they divert resources away from 
their most productive uses and, by delaying investment in export sectors, these taxes 
may contribute to balance of payments difficulties.  Id. at 22; see also id. at 31, box 1.  
In the discussion at the Board on this paper, directors agreed that “first-best” policies 
may not be immediately appropriate but that policies which are not optimal should 
be phased out as soon as feasible.  See IMF, IMF Executive Board Discusses Staff Papers on 
Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries, Public Information Notice (PIN) 
No. 05/45, Mar. 29, 2005; see also SANJIEEV GUPTA ET AL., REBUILDING FISCAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES, IMF Occasional Paper No. 247 (2005). 
 25 The “no-overdraft” rule refers to the need for the central government to cover 
expenditures with revenue, that is, the rule eliminates the possibility that the gov-
ernment runs a budget deficit.  For the details of such reforms and the problems 
they have created see DEL CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 166–90. 
DEL CASTILLO (FINAL) 12/1/2008  4:31:26 PM 
1286 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1265 
 
reconstruction, with dire security and political consequences.  The 
commercial exploitation of these resources could have facilitated re-
construction and the creation of jobs for thirty percent of the labor 
force that is unemployed.  Instead, with the strong support of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, Timor-Leste created a Norwegian style 
petroleum fund to save the money for a rainy day when in fact it is 
now pouring in the country.  This policy, in conjunction with a policy 
of zero domestic or foreign borrowing, was too restrictive in a country 
at the bottom of the HDI. 
What may be best practice for a developed country such as Nor-
way with an aging population, will certainly not be best practice for a 
developing country with the largest population growth in the world 
and a large proportion of which is younger than fifteen years old, one 
of the lowest per capita income levels, seriously damaged infrastruc-
ture, and a lagging reconstruction program.  This was acknowledged 
by the Asian Development Bank—an IFI as well—which noted that “it 
is unclear that the current policy on drawdowns is the best approach, 
given the early stage of the economy’s development . . . [and the fact 
that] [n]ew discoveries of energy in the future . . . may well mean that 
future generations are much better off than the current genera-
tion.”26
On the other hand, the Vietnamese took a different approach.  
When the IMF recommended that the government save some of its 
oil windfall in 2006 and 2007, the authorities questioned the appro-
priateness of saving it.  In fact, they argued that a country at Viet-
nam’s level of development would be better off using the windfall up-
front to increase investment and deal with huge gaps in public 
infrastructure.27  This is the approach that Timor-Leste should have 
taken because infrastructure deficiencies are a main deterrent to pri-
vate investment and sustained growth. 
In Timor-Leste—as in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC), and other post-conflict countries—peace will be 
ephemeral unless economic reconstruction takes place in the frame-
work of dynamic economic growth, political inclusion, and national 
reconciliation.  Business as usual policies, inflexible institutional ar-
rangements, and best practices in pursuit of purely economic objec-
tives can have tragic consequences.  The political objective of peace 
should prevail at all times.  This may not be possible in the context of 
 26 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 246 (2006). 
 27 See IMF, Vietnam: 2006 Article IV Consultations—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director 
for Vietnam, at 9, IMF Country Report No. 06/421 (Nov. 29, 2006). 
DEL CASTILLO (FINAL) 12/1/2008  4:31:26 PM 
2008] ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION 1287 
 
an over-complex and inflexible macroeconomic and institutional 
framework. 
C. IFIs’ Financial Support for Reconstruction28
In the immediate post–Cold War period, the IMF and the World 
Bank used the same mechanisms to finance post-conflict economic 
reconstruction as they did to finance normal development.  Thus, the 
IMF used Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), normally with high condi-
tionality that was hard on countries coming out of war.  Similarly, the 
World Bank supported these countries with Structural Adjustment 
Loans (SAL)that were used to support countries under normal de-
velopment—rather than those in a multipronged transition to peace 
where the main concern should have been avoiding a relapse into 
conflict.  This was the case (or the option) during post-conflict recon-
struction in El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia, Guatemala, and 
others. 
In the past, bilateral and other donors preferred to provide “pro-
ject finance”—that is, funding allocated to specific programs moni-
tored by them—rather than to provide “budgetary support,” where 
countries have more flexibility to use the money as they see fit.  Bud-
getary support through the creation of “trust funds” became more 
common starting in the mid-1990s.  Trust funds are often adminis-
tered by the World Bank.  In addition to the regular performance-
based allocations (PBA) of IDA financing at concessional terms,29 the 
World Bank started financing post-conflict countries through the 
Post-Conflict Fund (PCF), the Low-Income Countries Under Stress 
(LICUS) Implementation Trust Fund, a Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and 
a number of country-specific trust funds.  Through some of these 
funds the World Bank has channeled grants—as opposed to loans—
 28 For a full discussion of the different financing mechanisms of the Fund and 
the World Bank, see IMF Home Page, http://www.imf.org (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008); World Bank Home Page, http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008).  For a broader discussion on issues related to IFIs financing mechanisms, see 
DEL CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 66–93.  For a discussion of IMF and World Bank fi-
nancing mechanisms, see IMF, Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries and the HIPC Frame-
work, SM/01/99, (Mar. 30, 2001); IMF, Concluding Remarks by the Acting Chairman As-
sistance to Post-Conflict Countries and the HIPC Framework, BUFF/O1/57, (Apr. 19, 
2001); IMF, Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries: Progress Report (1999) (unpub-
lished); IMF, Update on the Financing of PRGF and HIPC Operations and the Subsidization 
of Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance, (2003).  See also World Bank, The Role of the World 
Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda, (2003). 
 29 World Bank financing through IDA is on concessional (preferential) terms 
(interest-free loans with a fee charge of 0.75% and forty years repayment), but the 
amount is quite limited. 
DEL CASTILLO (FINAL) 12/1/2008  4:31:26 PM 
1288 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1265 
for short-term budgetary support and emergency projects.  Neverthe-
less, the UNDP and the U.N. agencies, which fund themselves 
through voluntary contributions, continue to be a more important 
source of grants to post-conflict countries. 
By the mid-1990s, the Fund was also revising its financing me-
chanisms for post-conflict countries.  In 1995, the Fund expanded the 
scope of its Emergency Assistance Facility to include post-conflict 
countries, in addition to those recovering from natural disasters.  The 
Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA), as the new facility was 
named, is supported by policy advice and in many cases by technical 
assistance to rebuild the national capacity for macroeconomic poli-
cymaking in eligible countries. 
Constraining requirements—including an international con-
certed effort in support of the country, the absence of arrears to the 
Fund, and a commitment on the part of the country to move to a SBA 
or Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in the future—
have limited the eligibility of countries to the EPCA.  Although this 
facility’s funding is quickly disbursed with “no conditionality,” there is 
“no concessionality” in it either.  This means that countries coming 
out of war have to pay normal (rather than preferential) rates of in-
terest to the Fund.  Because EPCA lending is limited to twenty-five 
percent of the quota (raised in 2004 to fifty percent) and funding 
from this facility has often been used to pay arrears to the Bretton 
Woods institutions, the real impact of this facility, which has been 
used by only twelve countries, has been quite limited.  Moreover, the 
“repayment period” of three and one-quarter to five years has been 
much too short for post-conflict countries. 
The EPCA and the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Ini-
tiative of the World Bank and the Fund require that the country build 
up a good “track record” to qualify for “concessionality.”  Since 2001, 
donors subsidize EPCA interest but only for countries with a track re-
cord which makes them eligible for the PRGF.  This is also the case 
for debt reduction in which countries must establish a track record of 
good policies before they become eligible for the HIPC Initiative. 
LICUS World Bank Initiative adopted after 9/11 shifted the fo-
cus of attention toward achievement of the U.N. Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs)—a development as usual focus—rather than a 
post-conflict one.  By including post-conflict countries with other 
countries under stress, the special needs and risks in the former are 
conflated with the normal development needs of the latter. 
The same is true of including post-conflict states with other “fra-
gile states.”  Fragile states are defined as those least likely to achieve 
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the MDGs, likely to receive inadequate aid for their social and eco-
nomic needs, and which lag behind other low-income countries in 
terms of economic performance.30  In January 2005, a Senior Level 
Forum (SLF) on Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States, co-sponsored by 
the World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment’s Development Assistance Committee, the European 
Commission (EC), and the UNDP, brought together senior officials, 
leading development practitioners, government reformers in fragile 
states, and academics to examine aid issues relating to fragile states, 
donor coordination, and donor policy coherence.  At the annual 
meetings of the World Bank and IMF in October 2007, the heads of 
the Bretton Woods institutions and other development banks dis-
cussed a strategy for deepening their collaboration and strengthening 
their engagement in “fragile” situations. 
Although the focus on the most vulnerable countries and efforts 
to make assistance more effective are welcome, the inclusion of post-
conflict states with other fragile states—as within the LICUS Initia-
tive—is unfortunate because it leads to a “development as usual” ap-
proach.  In fact, this was confirmed by the statement of the heads of 
the IFIs in October 2007, which posited that “addressing fragility is 
one of the highest priorities of the development community.  Fragile 
situations undermine the development prospects of individual coun-
tries and can also affect regional stability and security.”31  They agreed 
to a set of goals, principles, operational approaches, and working ar-
rangements to deal with fragile states.  Because, as discussed earlier, 
the “peace” objective should prevail over the “development” objective 
in countries coming out of war, the goals of international assistance 
to post-conflict countries should be determined at the highest politi-
cal level—including the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Secre-
tariat—and not by the development community, including the 
UNDP, the World Bank, and other development and financial institu-
tions. 
At the present time, thirty-five countries have been identified as 
fragile states.  Unless the special needs and risks of post-conflict coun-
 30 “The Fragile States Group is a unique forum that brings together experts on 
governance, conflict prevention and reconstruction from bilateral and multilateral 
development co-operation agencies to facilitate co-ordination and share good prac-
tice to enhance development effectiveness in ‘fragile states.’”  Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/department/fragile 
states. 
 31 Press Release, Inter-American Development Bank, Development Banks Com-
mit to Closer Collaboration Working in Fragile Situations (Oct. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.iadb.org/news/detail.cfm?language=EN&id=4092. 
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tries are addressed with specific strategies and policies, these coun-
tries will continue with a fifty-fifty chance of reverting to conflict.  
Keeping the course with a “development as usual” approach will fail 
to improve this dismal record. 
VI. A MOVE TOWARDS GREATER FLEXIBILITY? 
In April 2006, the Fund’s Medium-Term Strategy (MTS),32 which 
establishes new directions for surveillance, also called for more fo-
cused engagement and greater flexibility in program design and 
lending facilities for fragile states (including post-conflict coun-
tries).33  In April 2008, the IMF Board discussed a paper presented by 
the staff entitled The Fund’s Engagement in Fragile States and Post-Conflict 
Countries—A Review of Experiences—Issues and Options.34  The Review 
concluded that the Fund’s engagement in these states has been 
“broadly effective.” 
In establishing effectiveness, the Fund staff has been using the 
“wrong yardstick.”  Given the primacy of the political objective in 
post-conflict economic reconstruction, a different yardstick should be 
used to measure success than is the case under conditions of normal 
development.  The effectiveness of the Fund and other IFI policies 
cannot be measured only by how much the country grew, lowered in-
flation, improved its fiscal balance, and accumulated reserves.  As dis-
cussed above, low-income countries coming out of war often grow 
simply because of the presence of the international community and 
large volumes of aid, neither of which is sustainable.  This growth 
creates serious distortions.  The yardstick should be whether Fund 
policies are improving the wellbeing of the population which is essen-
tial for national reconciliation and peace consolidation in the short-
term, and whether it is helping to create a “good economy” in the 
long-term.  For this, the government has to be able to provide basic 
services and infrastructure to establish its legitimacy, develop the le-
gal, institutional, and regulatory framework, provide a small and effi-
 32 See IMF, The Managing Director’s Report on Implementing the Fund’s Medium-Term 
Strategy, Apr. 5, 2006; IMF Press Release, A Medium-Term Strategy for the IMF: Meet-
ing the Challenge of Globalization, U.N. Doc. 06/01 (Apr. 18, 2006). 
 33 For a discussion of “fragile states” and the activities of the World Bank in them, 
see World Bank, Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries, http://www.worldbank. 
org/conflict (last visited Oct. 16, 2008). 
 34 The report is for official use only.  See IMF (2008b), IMF Executive Board Dis-
cusses the Fund’s Engagement in Fragile States and Post-Conflict Countries—A Review of Ex-
perience, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/43 of April 1, 2008 [hereinafter Re-
view]; and IMF, IMF Evaluates Its Involvement With Fragile States, IMF Survey Online, 
April 1, 2008 [hereinafter Survey Online]. 
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cient bureaucracy, and ensure adequate credit.  Only in such envi-
ronment will the creativeness of the people and businesses thrive and 
create much needed licit jobs.  The inflexibility of IMF- and World 
Bank-sponsored policies and institutional frameworks—and the short 
period over which adjustment is expected to take place—have often 
impeded rather than facilitate the creation of a good economy. 
In a way, the Review acknowledged the problems associated with 
their assistance to these countries by recognizing that there have 
been “certain gaps in the Fund’s engagement which have significant 
implications for certain fragile states.”35  Furthermore, the Review ac-
cepted that “in some programs, the structural reform agenda may 
have been overambitious, in view of severe administrative capacity 
constraints; the coverage and sequencing of measures may have been 
inappropriate; and insufficient attention may have been paid to pub-
lic financial management, governance, and generating the political 
consensus for reform.”36  In light of these and other shortcomings, 
the Review recognized that “the transition to an upper credit tranche 
(UCT)-standard arrangement may have been premature.”37  Because 
of this and other failings, the Review concludes that “a more system-
atic, graduated approach could improve the coherence of the Fund’s 
engagement.”38  In the staff’s view,  
 
[a] medium-term framework that explicitly adjusts 
Fund policy advice and monitoring, capacity building, 
signaling, and financial assistance to a country’s evolv-
ing capacity to formulate and implement macroeco-
nomic policy, and that builds on the countries’ com-
mitment to reform, would allow the Fund to offer 
fragile states an engagement that is better attuned to 
their deep-rooted problems.39
 
The Executive Board supported the conclusions of the Review 
that a more systematic and graduated approach could improve the ef-
fectiveness of the Fund’s engagement with fragile states.  However, 
the Board was divided on whether the proposal for a new formal 
 35 Review, supra note 34, at 5. 
 36 Id. at 14.  
 37 Id. at 5. 
 38 Id. at 5, 17. 
 39 Id. at 5. 
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framework entitled Economic Recovery Assistance Program (ERAP) 
was necessary or whether present arrangements could be modified.40
Because Management has to return to the Executive Board with 
a follow-up paper on this issue, a debate on the merits of the ERAP 
proposal should occur.  As stated in the Review, rather than propos-
ing a major change in the Fund’s policies or instruments, ERAP 
combines the modes of the Fund’s present engagement with fragile 
states into a consistent medium-term framework.41  ERAP would in-
clude two phases.  The first phase would be a non-financing phase, 
emphasizing capacity building and macroeconomic policy support.  
Once sufficient implementation capacity has been established, and 
provided a balance of payments financing need exists, the country 
could enter the second phase which would provide Fund financial 
support, the Economic Recovery Financial Assistance (ERFA) to any 
eligible low-income, fragile state under terms and conditions similar 
to those under the EPCA.  Non low-income post-conflict countries 
would continue to be eligible for EPCA under the existing policy.  
Successful implementation of phase two would provide a track record 
to assess readiness for transition to a UCT-standard program.  It is 
proposed that the financial support to fragile states under the ERFA 
be on concessional, possibly PRGF terms, and that for HIPC-eligible 
fragile states, the ERFA would count toward the decision point track 
record under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. 
This proposal is welcomed in one sense and is still lacking in an-
other.  On the one hand, by proposing that ERFA financing for low 
income post-conflict countries be at concessional, possibly PRGF 
terms, this is certainly an improvement over EPCA which is non-
concessional except for countries eligible for PRGF terms, i.e., those 
that have built up a “track record.”  On the other hand, by contem-
plating that countries will move to the second phase only within three 
years, the ERAP proposal deprives post-conflict countries of the 
Fund’s financial assistance in the immediate transition to peace—a 
financing that is often critical in avoiding a relapse of conflict. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Failure at effective post-conflict reconstruction has led to human 
tragedy, large number of displaced populations and refugees, and a 
huge burden to taxpayers in donor countries.  At the same time, 
 40 Survey Online, supra note 34. 
 41 Review, supra note 34, at 17–18. 
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failed states are an incubator for terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, 
and other illegal activities. 
Donors’ resources allocated to post-conflict countries have been 
largely for military, security, and peacekeeping operations rather 
than for economic reconstruction.  Past experience has clearly shown 
that the less successful reconstruction is in creating jobs and improv-
ing the wellbeing of the population at large, the more will be needed 
to address insecurity.  Although a total figure is not available, U.S. da-
ta mentioned earlier for total expenditure in Afghanistan and Iraq 
are nevertheless indicative of the magnitude of resources spent and 
the burden to taxpayers of dealing with post-conflict countries.  Since 
9/11, Congress has authorized budgetary expenditures of about $860 
billion (of which Afghanistan and Iraq account for $820 billion).42  
Of the total, $810 billion were allocated to the Department of De-
fense and only less that $50 billion to the Department of 
State/USAID for reconstruction.  With a population of about 300 mil-
lion, this represents roughly $3,000 per person and $12,000 per fam-
ily in the United States. 
In the first year of the Bush Administration, the budget surplus 
amounted to $90 billion.  Beginning with the war in Afghanistan at 
the end of 2001 and aggravating with the war in Iraq, the budget 
turned into a huge deficit.  From 2002 to 2008 the average annual 
budget deficit was $460 billion dollars.  Contrary to previous wars, the 
wars on Afghanistan and Iraq were financed through higher debt 
rather than higher taxes.  By August 2008 (before the banking res-
cue), the national debt had surpassed $10 trillion, representing sev-
enty-three percent of GDP. Resources spent by the United Nations 
(also through taxpayers’ contributions), the IFIs, other international 
organizations, other bilateral donors, and NGOs in post-conflict 
countries are also large.43  The U.N. peacekeeping budget for 2008–
2009 is $7 billion.  In addition, the programs and U.N. agencies have 
their own budgets to deal with post-conflict countries through volun-
tary contributions. 
Despite the large investment that the international community 
has made in post-conflict countries, the record in rebuilding war-torn 
states is dismal.  A large number of countries either revert to conflict 
 42 See supra note 17 for data on the U.S. military and civilian expenditure in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq.  See also United States Government Accountability Office, Global 
War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/. 
 43 The cost to taxpayers is different in the IFIs where the IMF and the World 
Bank lend and charge for their lending. 
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or fail to create a dynamic and inclusive national economy, thus be-
coming highly aid-dependent on the international community in the 
process. 
If effectively utilized, resources allocated to rebuilding war-torn 
countries could have a high rate of return.  Otherwise, they are a ma-
jor diversion from much-needed international funding for normal 
development, the environment and the elimination of transmittable 
diseases. The United Nations announced in September 2008 that aid 
has fallen by twelve percent in the last two years.  Amid large reces-
sionary pressures and unsatisfied needs for health, education, infra-
structure, and energy in donor countries, in conjunction with the 
worst banking and credit crisis since 1929, less (rather than more) aid 
is likely in the near future. 
There is thus an urgent need to debate the issues and the policy 
options for post-conflict economic reconstruction.  This is necessary 
in order to find better tools, strategies, and channels through which 
aid and technical assistance could be more cost-effective in promot-
ing reconstruction.  Without a change in course, countries will not be 
able to create the productive and dynamic investment and the sus-
tainable employment that is necessary to improve their livelihoods, 
sustain the peace, and avoid aid dependency. 
Putting the economies on a path of stabilization and sustainable 
growth is imperative during post-conflict economic reconstruction.  
Reintegration of a large number of former combatants, returnees, 
and other groups affected by the conflict will not be possible in stag-
nant economies.  Furthermore, putting the house in order is also im-
portant because donors will be increasingly unwilling to help coun-
tries that do not help themselves.  This is why the IFIs play such an 
important role in post-conflict countries. 
Despite recent efforts by the IFIs to improve their assistance to 
these countries, their policy advice remains inappropriate, their fi-
nancing instruments remain too tough and inflexible, and the ad-
justment process too short for these countries to be able to success-
fully rebuild their war-torn economies.  One of the lessons from 
recent failures with post-conflict reconstruction is that market-based 
reforms and stable macroeconomic policies are necessary but not suf-
ficient to create jobs.  In all cases, the government needs to play an 
active role (including the use of subsidies and price support mecha-
nisms) to promote private investment and economic inclusion.  This 
requires a flexible macroeconomic and institutional framework 
(unlike the one promoted by the IFIs in Afghanistan, East Timor, and 
elsewhere) even if macroeconomic stabilization is somewhat delayed 
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in the process.  Only such a framework would allow for the active 
government intervention that is needed to succeed at reintegrating 
various war-affected groups into the productive and licit economy.  
Without such intervention, reconstruction may not be sustainable.  
The market alone will not suffice.44
Both the IMF and the World Bank have followed a “selectivity 
policy” in the sense of targeting resources and providing concessional 
terms to countries that have established a track record of “good poli-
cies.”  This process follows a perverse logic: rather than helping coun-
tries in the immediate transition to peace, which is the most fragile 
phase, countries are asked to build up “credibility” and “national ca-
pacity” first.  The latter would indeed facilitate the effective use of 
aid.  In the meantime, roughly half of the countries in the transition 
to peace revert to war.  The international community can continue to 
ignore this only at its own risk. 
 44 For possible effective use of subsidies to create licit and productive employ-
ment in post-conflict economies see Edmund S. Phelps & Graciana del Castillo, A 
Strategy to Help Afghanistan Kick Its Habit, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, at 7; and Gra-
ciana del Castillo & Edmund S. Phelps, The Road to Post-War Recovery,  PROJECT 
SYNDICATE, July 2007, available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ 
phelps9. 
